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I.
JURISDICTION
The judgment that is the subject of this Appeal is a
final order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County awarding attorney's fees to Nielsen & Senior,
attorneys for the Personal Representative for extraordinary
services rendered in a probate estate (R. pp. 325-326).
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-3 (2)(j) (1953).

Pursuant

to Rule 4-A, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, this appeal
was transferred to the Court of Appeals for disposition
pursuant to an Order of the Supreme Court dated March 28,
1990.
The judgment of the District Court was dated December
19, 1989 (R, pp. 325-26).

Notice of Appeal was filed

January 17, 1990 (R, p. 362).

II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

WHETHER THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND

EXPENSES

BY THE TRIAL COURT IS WITHIN THE STATUTORY

AUTHORITY OF THE TRIAL COURT AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE?
By

law, attorney's

fees are to be paid

to the

attorneys for the Personal Representative of a Probate
estate

§75-3-718 and §75-3-719 U.C.A. (1953 as amended)
-1-

(Add. 1 ) .

Findings of fact should be made which support

the award.

Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985).

Only if no evidence is presented or proffered at trial on
the issue of an award of Attorney's fees is an award of
attorney's fees an abuse of discretion requiring the award
to be overturned.

Hal Taylor Associates v. Union America,

Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982).
2.

WHETHER THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDED

WAS WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT?
Where there is evidence regarding attorney's fees at
trial, the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded, are in
the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be
disturbed
Turtle

in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.

Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645

P.2d 667 (Utah 1982).

It is to be presumed that the trial

court properly exercised its discretion unless the record
clearly shows to the contrary.

Regional Sales Agency v.

Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah App. 1989).

Goddard v.

Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-535 (Utah 1984).
3.
EXPERT

WHETHER THE COSTS AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT FOR

WITNESS

DISBURSEMENTS"

FEES, COPYING, ETC., ARE
WHICH

ARE TO

BE PAID

"EXPENSES

FROM

THE

AND

PROBATE

ESTATE?
Expenses
Representative,

and

disbursements

including

but not

of

limited

a

Personal

to attorney's

fees and costs, are to be paid from the probate estate.
-2-

§75-3-719 (1953 as amended) (Add.l).
4.

WHETHER FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

MADE ORALLY BY THE TRIAL COURT AND RECORDED IN OPEN COURT
FOLLOWING THE CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE BUT WHICH ARE NOT
REPEATED IN THE WRITTEN ORDER WHERE THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
APPEAR ARE SUFFICIENT?
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made orally
and recorded in open court are sufficient without more.
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

III.
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
75-3-101 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1975) - See Addendum 1
75-3-106 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1975) - See Addendum 1
75-3-705 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1977) - See Addendum 1
75-3-707 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1975) - See Addendum 1
75-3-715 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1975) - See Addendum 1
75-3-718 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1977 & 1987)See Addendum 1
75-3-719 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1975) - See Addendum 1
75-3-805 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1975) - See Addendum 1
75-3-808 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1975) - See Addendum 1
78-2-3(2)(j) U.C.A. (1953) Rule 52(a)

See Addendum 1

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure-See Addendum 1

Rule 54(d)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure-See Addendum 1

-3-

IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Statement of the Case as set forth by the Appellant
contains many statements and allegations more properly
characterized as argument, and therefore, a new Statement
of the Case is made as follows:
A.

Nature

of

the Case.

Kipp Quinn f

Appellant,

hereinafter referred to as "Kipp", who is not related to
the decedent, the Successor Personal Representative of> the
Estate of Fenton Glade Quinn, Sr., hereinafter referred to
as

"Glade", appeals the award of attorney's fees and

expenses

to

the attorneys

for

the

former

Personal

Representative, Fenton Glade Quinn, Jr., hereinfter
referred to as "Fenton", the decedent's son and Respondent
herein.

The only issue at the trial was the proper amount

of attorney's fees and Personal Representative's expenses
and disbursements to be awarded.

Attorney's fees and

expenses were awarded in the amounts of (a) $24,181.00 and
$340.32,

respectively, for the Administration

of the

Estate,

(b) $20,706.00 and $3,952.60, respectively, for

legal services rendered Fenton and the Estate in defending
a claim for $650,000.00 and the resulting legal action for
wrongful death which resulted in a judgment against the
Estate for $200,000.00 less than asserted on the claim, and
(c) $6,781.00

and

$184.32, respectively,

for

legal

representation of the Estate in litigation against Penny
-4-

McGrath, a debtor of the Estate, which resulted

in a

recovery by the Estate of over $75,000.00.
B.
this

Course of Proceeding,
appeal

arises

was

The Proceeding out of which
commenced

by

Petition

for

Compensation of Attorneys and Reimbursement of Expenses in
Estate Litigation filed October 10, 1989 by Nielsen &
Senior, attorneys for Fenton as Personal Representative of
the Estate

(R. p. 34).

Only

the Proceeding of this

Petition is now before this Court.

Other, independent

proceedings, as defined in §75-3-106(1)(a) U.C.A. (1953 as
amended) (Add. 1 ) , conducted in Glade's Estate included:
(a) Petition for Determination of Intestacy and Fenton1s
Appointment as Personal Representative, filed June 12, 1984
(R. p. 34), (b) Petition for Supervised Administration and
Order Enjoining the Waste of Assets

(R. p. 34), filed

September 14, 1984 by Kipp which was denied, (c) Petition
For Order Determining That Fenton Quinn Predeceased Dawana
Quinn for Purposes of Heirship, and Distribution of Glade's
Estate filed by Kipp on August 10, 1984 (R. p. 43). After
several appearances by counsel and extensive efforts to
prepare for the trial set on the Petition (R. p. 55),
Kipp's Petition was denied as a matter of law for stating a
claim upon which relief could not be granted

(R. p. 134),

(d) Petition for Order Restraining Personal Representative
filed by Kipp on September 28, 1984 (R. p. 51) which was
denied,

(e)

Wrongful Death action commenced by Kipp for
-5-

damages

resulting

from the death of his mother,

(f)

Petition by Kipp filed on October 25, 1988 to remove Fenton
during

the pendency of Fenton1s appeal of the Wrongful

Death action,

(g) Petition for allowance of Personal

Representative's fees filed by Fenton which was denied (R.
p. 352),

(h) Petition for Allowance of Exempt Property

filed by Fenton which is still pending (R. p. 359),

(i)

Petition

for

filed

by

Kipp

on

August

18, 1989,

Determination of Attorney's Fees (R. p. 205).
C.

Disposition

at Trial,

Following

the trial on

November 7, 1990 before the Honorable Scott Daniels of the
Third District Court sitting without a Jury on the sole
issue of attorney's fees and expenses and disbursements,
the Court in open court, entered its findings of fact (R.
pp. 114-117), and awarded Nielsen & Senior, attorneys for
Fenton as Personal Representative of the Estate: $24,181.00
attorney's fees and $340.32 costs in the Administration of
the Estate, $20,706.00 attorney's fees and $3,952.60 costs
in the defense by the Estate of the Wrongful Death action,
and $6,781.00 attorney's fees and $184.32 costs in Fenton's
lawsuit against Penny McGrath for recovery of debts due to
the Estate.

(T. pp. 115-117)

No award of attorney's fees

or costs was made for the legal services rendered in
Fenton's appeal of the Wrongful Death judgment in which the
Estate was not successful and for which $6,560.50 fees and
$353.10 costs had been requested.
-6-

The Order entered by the

trial court stated that the fees and costs were to have
priority as a cost or expense of Administration of the
Estate
D.

(R. p. 325).
Relevant Facts,

Fenton was appointed Personal

Representative of Glade's Estate, without objection or
contest, on June 27, 1984 (R. p. 18).
Kipp's claim against the Estate for $650,000.00 was
disallowed

(R. p. 104), and Kipp filed a Wrongful Death

action in which judgment was entered against the Estate* for
about $200,000.00 less than the claim filed by Kipp.

The

Estate subsequently filed an appeal.
During the pendency of the appeal, the Estate commenced
an action against Penny McGrath, to recover debts due to
the Estate, and Kipp filed a Petition to remove Fenton as
Personal Representative and to appoint himself. (R. p.
175).

Kipp

was

denied

appointment

as

Personal

Representative, and Fenton continued to serve (R. p. 190).
On April 18, 1989, this Court entered
denying Fenton1s appeal. (R. p. 323).

its decision

Kipp was appointed

Successor Personal Representative on June 20, 1989 (R. p.
197) .
The Petition in this Proceeding requested compensation
for legal services and expenses in regard to: (a) the
Administration of the Estate, (b) the McGrath lawsuit, (c)
the Wrongful Death action and, (d) Appeal of the judgment
in the Wrongful Death matter (R. pp. 214-317; T. p. 8 ) .
-7-

The original value of the Estate was estimated to be
about $600,000.00 (R. p. 42). Very fewf if any, of Glade's
records were available to Fenton from which to prepare an
accurate inventory (T. pp. 78, 80, 81, 83).

Glade's home

and its contents were in Kipp's sole possession. (T. pp.
81, 95 & 96). Fenton was denied access to the records (T.
pp. 43, 78, 80, & 81). Judge T. Hansen ordered Fenton to
deliver an Inventory to Kipp (R. p. 184) which he did.

A

previous Inventory had been prepared but not filed, and-the
supplementary Inventory showing the revised market values
as of the date of the decedent's death as required by §753-707 U.C.A. (1953, as amended) (Add. 1) was delivered and
filed by Fenton in 1988 (R. p. 78).
Fenton retained Nielsen & Senior to assist him in the
Estate Administration and Estate litigation on an hourly
basis measured by the rate of the attorney performing the
services (T. pp. 52 & 79). If the Estate was complicated,
it was understood that the statutory fee was not a cap on
fees (T. p. 52).
Nielsen

& Senior

filed

its only

compensation with its Petition.

application

for

No other statements were

ever submitted to the Court for approval. (T. p. 16).

VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The presence of economic gain, i.e. "benefit", to
-8-

the estate as a result of legal services is not something
the Court must consider in making its award of attorney's
fees and expenses and disbursements.

No evidence was

introduced at the trial that the Personal Representative
failed to act in good faith at any time nor that he failed
to perform his duties as Personal Representative.

The

testimony at trial of the attorneys who actually performed
the legal services for the Personal Representative as to
the

complexity

of

the

Estate,

the

difficulty* of

administering the estate, the reasonableness of the hours
spent

in

rendering

legal

services

to

the

Personal

Representative, the expertise and experience

of

attorney

in the

involved, the fee customarily charged

the

community for similar services, and the original estimate
of the size of the estate, together with the detailed
statement of each item of work performed and the time
expended

thereon and the amounts charged with respect

thereto provided to the trial court at the trial, and the
testimony of the Personal Representative at trial are all
that

are

necessary

for

the

trial

court

to make a

determination of a reasonable attorney's fee.
The trial court heard the evidence but did not believe
Kipp's allegations that Fenton acted improperly to deprive
the creditors and made a proper award of attorney's fees
and expenses and disbursements.
2. Comparisons of attorney fees to the size of the
-9-

probate estate are improper in a very complexf difficult,
and unusual estate.

The Court considered all of the

relevant factors necessary to make a sound decision after
hearing the witnesses' testimony and reviewing the detailed
billing statements introduced at the trial and judging the
credibility thereof.
3. Awards of all expenses and disbursements of the
Personal Representative in administering the estate and
prosecuting
authorized

and defending proceedings are specifically
by statute.

A Personal

Representative's

expenses and disbursements includes not only "costs" as the
term "costs" is used in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
but also many other things. The Trial Court acted properly
in its award of the expenses and disbursements.
4. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered
by the Court either in writing or orally in open court
where they were recorded are sufficient to sustain its
award of attorney's fees and expenses and disbursements,

VII.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE 1
WHETHER THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES BY THE
TRIAL COURT IS WITHIN THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY OF THE TRIAL
COURT AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE?
A Personal Representative is not personally liable on
contracts entered into as a Personal Representative.
-10-

§75-

3-808(1) U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Add. 1). The Estate of
the decedent is liable, §75-3-808(3) (1953 as amended)
(Add, l) r and any successor Personal Representative is duty
bound by the contracts of his predecessor.

§75-3-808(3)

and §75-3-715 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Add.l).
§75-3-718 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Add. 1 ) , prior to
Amendment, provided
attorney

that the Personal Representative's

was entitled

to reasonable compensation

for

services, but not to exceed the amounts set forth in-the
statutory fee schedule for a normal probate.

Additional

attorney's fees deemed just and reasonable by the Court
could be awarded for extraordinary services.

As amended,

the statute now provides that attorney's are entitled to
reasonable compensation for services, (Add. 1).
§75-3-719 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Add. 1) requires
that the Estate of the decedent pay all necessary expenses
and disbursements, including reasonable attorney's fees of
the Personal Representative if he defends or prosecutes any
proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not.
The

foregoing

attorney's

statutes both authorize an award of

fees and expenses for services rendered in

Probate Proceedings.

The only statutory standards are:

reasonableness in amount and good faith on the part of the
Personal

Representative

in deciding

to defend

or to

prosecute which are questions of fact to be determined by
the trial court.

Regional Sales Agency v. Reichert, 784
-11-

P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah App. 1989), Goddard v. Hickman, 685
P.2d 530, 534-535 (Utah 1984).
The old "benefit to the estate" test became obsolete
when the legislature enacted these statutes unless 20/20
hindsight following an unsuccessful prosecution or defense
manages to equate unsuccessful with bad faith.

It seems

inconceivable that successful prosecution or defense would
ever be regarded as bad faith.
At the conclusion of the trial in these Proceedings-and
after having heard all of the evidence relating to the fees
for

legal

services

rendered

in connection

with

the

Administration of the Estate, the Court found that: (a)
this

was

an

exceptionally

unusual

Estate;

(b) that

decedents [Glade and Dawana] died at the same time; (c)
that there was a lack of records; (d) that there was
animosity generated between the heirs of the two Estates;
and

(e) that the complexity of the Estate justified an

award of $24,181.00 fees andv$340.32 costs for the services
rendered in the Estate Administration (T. pp. 114 & 115).
Based upon the proffer of evidence on the issue and the
testimony

of the attorneys who worked on the matters

involved that the work was necessary, beneficial to the
Estate, and reasonable in the amount of time spent, items
of work performed, and in terms of amount, and that the
rates charged were reasonable based upon the experience and
expertise of the attorneys involved and the time and place
-12-

in the Salt Lake City market (T. pp. 9 & 10), the court
made its decision,
Kipp's attorney had full opportunity to call witnesses
and

to cross-examine

various

Proceedings

the attorneys who worked on the
which

produced

the

following

uncontradicted testimony:
(a) The value of the decedent's estate at the outset was
reasonably

believed

$600,000.00,

to be between

(T. p. 42).

$500,000.00

and

Kipp now complains that no

breakdown was given, but his attorney did not ask for one,
and cannot now be heard to complain about his own failure.
Associated Industrial Development, Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d
486, 489 (Utah 1984).
(b) All of the records were in the possession of Kipp
(T. pp. 43, 81 83, 95 & 96), and only some were produced as
a result of discovery by Fenton's attorneys
(c)

The circumstances surrounding

(T. p. 43).

the deaths were

unclear. Fenton had received information which required
investigation that the decedents had entered into a suicide
pact. (T. p. 44).
(d) Kipp filed a Petition requesting that the Court
Order that all of Glade's Estate passed to Dawana as a
matter of law

(T. p. 44) (R. 43). The matter was set for

a speedy trial, and it was necessary to prepare extensively
for

that

trial.

A Court Order was required

information from the police

(T. pp. 45 & 46).

-13-

to get

(e) The Cadillac which belonged to the Estate and which
Fenton had in his possession was taken without Fenton's
knowledge by Kipp's brother, Kelly, and was believed stolen
which required legal assistance (T. p. 46).

While Kelly

had the car, it was repossessed by the bank and sold in a
questionable manner (T. p. 47).
(f) Extensive

efforts were made to get

income tax

information and records but they did not seem to exist.
All of the records were kept in the decedent's home. - (T.
p. 48).

The home and its contents were in the possession

of Kipp. (T. pp. 95 & 96).
(g) A Complaint was filed by an alleged creditor of the
Estate, Menlove, beyond the statutory period for filing
claims on the theory that it involved insurance coverage.
Legal services were rendered in connection with that legal
action

(T. pp. 50 & 51).

(h) The Estate appeared to be insolvent due to the many
claims filed.

(T. pp. 49 & 50). Kipp filed at least three

different claims (R. pp. 32, 33, 83, 98) all of which were
disallowed by Fenton (T. pp. 81, 104).

Kipp only took

further action on one of the three claims.
(i) The home was threatened with foreclosure, but even
after a qualified buyer with the funds to purchase the home
was located, Kipp threatened to not cooperate in the sale
and to allow the Trustee on the Trust Deed to foreclose
upon the home unless his unresonable demands were met (T.
-14-

p. 54),

Legal services were rendered assisting Fenton in

meeting those demands without violating his fiduciary duty
to the others who had an interest in the Estate (T. p. 54).
(j) Many extra appearances had to be made in connection
with the Estate which are not required in a normal probate
due to Kippfs constant interference (T. p. 65).
(k) The testimony given of specific occurranees which
required legal assistance covered only part of the unusual
things which occurred in the Estate Admiinistration (T- p.
52) .
The

testimony

regarding

the

unusual

nature

and

complexity of the Estate Administration was that of a
qualified, expert witness (T. pp. 64 & 65). In addition to
the Estate Administration, testimony was given regarding
legal services rendered in the Wrongful Death litigation
and the McGrath litigation.
It is the testimony of the attorneys claiming the fees
which is most valuable and relevant. Associated Industrial
Development, Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486, 488 & 489 (Utah
1984),

and

the

Court

heard

that

testimony.

The

reasonableness of the fee to be awarded in regard to a
Probate is a matter which is primarily within the peculiar
knowledge and sound discretion of the Trial Court.
Smith's Estate, 162 P.2d 105, 111 (Utah 1945).

In Re

The amount

awarded as attorney's fees is within the sound discretion
of the Trial Court, and unless there is a clear abuse of
-15-

discretion, the amount of the award by the trial court will
not be disturbed.

Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis

Management, 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982).
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P. 2d 622 (Utah 1985), provides
at pp. 624 and 625 that:
fl

A court may consider, among other factors, the
difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the
attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness
of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee
customarily charged in the locality for similar
services, the amount involved in the case and the
result attained, and the expertise and experience of
the attorneys involved.11
These factors were placed into evidence and were considered
by the Court in finding the fees awarded to be reasonable
(T. pp. 114 through 117).
In regard to the Wrongful Death action, the evidence was
that the amount claimed was $650,000.00 (T. p. 27), that
the amount awarded was nearly $200,000.00 less the amount
claimed (T. p. 30), and that Fenton offered to settle with
Kipp for the value of all of the Estate's assets, prior to
trial but that Kipp demanded a settlement of $200,000.00
(T. pp. 29 & 94).

Specifically, the Court found that

Fenton's offer to settle for the total value of the Estate
was reasonable under the circumstances, that the offer was
unreasonably

rejected, and that Dawana's heirs were at

least as unreasonable as Glade's heirs

(T. p. 116). Based

upon the fact that a fair offer was made by the Estate and
only due to that, the Court awarded $20,706.00 attorney's
fees and $3,952.60 costs.

(T. pp. 116 & 117).
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The

Court

also

found

the

$6,781.00

fees

and

$184.32

costs incurred in connection with the McGrath litigation to
be

reasonable.

not only

(T. p. 1 1 5 ) .

by the testimony

This finding was

supported

of the attorneys who worked

on

the case, but also the admission of Kipp and his attorney
that

the

work

performed

on

McGrath

was

contributed to the benefit of the Estate.

necessary

and

(T. pp. 85, 108

Si 109) .
Fenton's

failure

to

file

immaterial.

An

beginning

the probate which

of

Inventory

an

was

Inventory

prepared

until

by

reflected,

198&

Fenton

at

is
the

to the best

of

the information then available to Fenton, the assets in the
Estate and their values. (T. p. 7 8 ) .

Kipp, not Fenton, was

in possession of all of Glade's property and papers and had
them

from

the time of Glade's death, including

the

stock

and other things which Fenton believed his father owned (T.
pp. 81 & 8 3 ) .

Kipp had possession of the decedent's home

and contents at all times. (T. pp. 95 & 9 6 ) .
§75-3-705

U.C.A.

(1953

as

amended)

only that an Inventory be prepared.

(Add.

1)

requires

There is no statutory

requirement that the Inventory be filed, nor is it a breach
of

duty

to fail

to file one.

ordered

Filing

Fenton

was

recent

version

market

values and descriptions

which

he

had

of

otherwise.

the

been

Then

Inventory

able

to
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was optional
he

which

filed

showed

based upon the

gather

up

to

the

the

until
most

revised

information

that

time

as

required by §75-3-707 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Add., 1).
It does not reflect all of the property Fenton believed
Glade owned at his death since he had been unable to get
any other documents from Kipp to prove Glade's ownership
(R. pp. 43, 78, 80 & 81) .
Fenton was not removed as Personal Representative for
dereliction of his duty to prepare an Inventory, but only
because it appeared to the court at that time, in other,
separate, independent Proceedings that Fenton may have
(emphasis added), improvidently incurred legal expenses and
costs of approximately $73,000.00. That is $17,000.00 more
than was finally awarded by the same Judge following the
trial in these Proceedings (R. p. 190).
significant difference.
failed

$17,000.00 is a

Kipp had his day in court and

to produce any credible testimony at trial to

support his wild allegations.

In light of the fact that no

fees or costs or expenses were awarded for the appeal (T.
p. 117) it appears that the logical explanation of the
court's action in removing Fenton in the prior, independent
Proceedings is that it based its prior decision only upon
Fenton's incurring attorney's fees and expenses for his
appeal of the Wrongful Death Judgment.

The trial court's

acted consistently in both Proceedings.
In making its award of attorney's fees and expenses, the
trial court also had a description of each item of work
performed by the attorneys, the time required to perform
-18-

each item of workf and the date upon which the services
were performed
accounting

(R. pp. 219-317).

It is exactly such

records which can substantiate the award of

attorney's fees.

IFG Leasing Co. v. Gordon, 776 P.2d 607,

608 (Utah 1989).
Although the fee for a normal probate of a $90,000.00
estate in which there was no litigation under the old fee
schedule was about $3,600.00, this Estate had extensive
litigation and was far from normal.

The Court found that

it was "...an exceptionally unusual estate..." (T. p. 114).
The decision of the Trial Court is authorized by statute
and fully supported by the evidence at trial.

ISSUE 2
WHETHER THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED WAS WITHIN
THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT?
The Trial Court, as the trier of fact, considered the
relationship of the fee to the complexity and exceptionally
unusual nature of the probate, the novelty and difficulty
of the issues involved, and the fact that the trial on the
Wrongful

Death matter was forced upon Fenton by the

unreasonable demand of Kipp and his brothers that the
Estate settle for more than the then determined value of
all of the Estate assets

(T. pp. 114-117).

Attorney's fees "...when awarded as allowed by law, are
awarded as a matter of legal right...", and the total
amount of attorney's fees awarded in a case cannot be said
-19-

to be unreasonable as a result of a comparison of those
fees to the amounts involved.
P.2d

622, 625 (Utah 1985).

Cabrera v. Cotrell, 694
This Court said: "We will

presume that the discretion of the trial court was properly
exercised unless the record clearly shows the contrary."
Regional Sales Agency v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215
(Utah App. 1989), (quoting Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d
530, 534-535 (Utah 1984) [quoting State ex rel Road Comm'n
v. General Oil Co., 22 Utah 2d 60, 62, 448 P.2d 718, 719
(Utah 1987) ] .
As discussed above, the test of whether proceedings
prosecuted

or defended by the Personal Representative

benefit the Estate economically or otherwise is no longer
determinative but is now only one of many factors to be
taken

into account

in determining

whether

or

prosecution or defense was undertaken in good faith.

not a
Even

then, the weight to be given the issue of benefit is
questionable since benefit necessarily requires an element
of success, and successful prosecution or defense is
specifically not required under §75-3-719 U.C.A. (1953 as
amended) (Add. 1).
Dennett v. First Security Bank, N.A., 439 P.2d 459 (Utah
1968) which was decided well before the adoption of the
Utah Uniform Probate Code is distinguishable on its facts,
and most, if not all, of the statements made therein,, are
no longer true under current Utah law.
-20-

For example, the

assets of an estate belong not to the creditors but to the
decedent's heirs subject
intervening

to, among other

things, the

rights of creditors under §75-3-101 U.C.A.

(1953 as amended) (Add. 1).
There was no evidence at the trial that Fenton acted in
bad faith in defending or prosecuting any matters, nor that
there was any intent on the part of anyone to incur such
large

legal

compensation.

fees as to deprive the creditors of any
These Proceedings are totally independent of

prior Proceedings.
previously

Consistent with the fact that the Court

thought

that

$73,000.00

may

have

improvidently incurred, it did not award $73,000.00.

been
It

awarded $17,000.00 less, which is a significant difference.
In Re Estate of Smith, 426 P.2d 575 (Montana 1967) in
which the Order of the trial court as to the amount of
attorney fees awarded was affirmed, was decided under the
law of Montana which was very different than the Utah
Uniform Probate Code. The facts are totally different from
the facts in this case except that the initial Personal
Representative

was

removed.

Mrs.

Smith,

the

Administratrix, failed to obtain a routine determination of
heirship for two years, and as a result the estate lost the
interest on $260,000.00 during that time.

Her failure to

render accountings and file an inventory were violations of
Montana law.

The hardships suffered by the Smith estate

were loss of interest on $260,000.00 for two years, loss of
-21-

tax benefits, and imposition of tax penalties.

In this

case there is no evidence of loss of interest, violation of
Utah law, loss of tax benefits, imposition of tax penalties
or any other hardship to Glade's Estate,

Further, Mr.

Smith's debts of $15,000,00 were small in relation to the
size of the Estate, whereas the debts in Glade's Estate
were very large.
Kipp produced no evidence that he spent $20,000.00 in
"correcting and supervising" Fenton.
that

Instead, it appears

those were the attorney's fees spent by Kipp in

prosecuting the Wrongful Death action. (T. p. 94).

The

Court examined the portions of the statement of Kipp's
attorney

which

it was given and determined

services

performed

by

Kipp's

attorney

and

that

the

Fenton's

attorneys were not comparable and that the fees awarded for
the Estate Administration were not unreasonable

(T. p.

115) .
Fenton had a fiduciary duty to defend the estate and its
other creditors from the excessive claims and improper
petitions filed by Kipp.
show, much

There is nothing in the record to

less clearly

show, that

improperly exercised its discretion.

the trial

court

The attorney's fees

awarded were within the sound discretion of the trial court
which

heard

the evidence, saw the witnesses as

they

testified, and was in a position to judge the credibility
of the testimony and evidence given.
-22-

ISSUE 3
WHETHER THE COSTS AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT FOR EXPERT
WITNESS FEES, COPYING, ETC. ARE "EXPENSES AND
DISBURSEMENTS" WHICH ARE TO BE PAID FROM THE PROBATE
ESTATE?
§75-3-719 U.C.A.

(1953 as amended) (Add. 1) requires

that the Estate of the decedent pay all necessary expenses
and

disbursements

of

the Personal

Representative

defending or prosecuting any proceeding in good faith.

in
The

term "costs" which is used in Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure (Add. 1) and discussed by the Utah
Supreme Court in Morgan v. Morgany

137 Ut. Adv. Rep. 35

(June 29, 1990) and defined in Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d
771 (Utah 1980)/ does not appear in the Probate statute.
Neither of the cases cited involve a probate, and both deal
with the definition of "costs" as used in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and not with "expenses and disbursements"
which would seem broad enough to include expenditures for
anything reasonably related to the proceedings.
The expenses the Estate was ordered to pay were $340.32
in the administration of the Estate

(R. pp. 259 through

261) which involved a number of Proceedings (T. pp. 41-65),
$184.32 in the McGrath litigation (R. pp. 278 & 279), and
$3,952.60, $3,604.00 of which was an expert witness fee, in
the wrongful death litigation (R. pp. 305 & 306).
Because a Personal Representative
liable

for obligations

incurred
-23-

is not personally

in the capacity of a

Personal Representative under §75-3-808 U.C.A.

(1953 as

amended)
(Add. 1) , the probate estate must be liable for the
expenses

and disbursements

incurred

in defending

or

prosecuting Proceedings. §75-3-808 and §75-3-719 U.C.A.
(1953 as amended).

The obligation of the Estate to pay is

not limited to "reimbursement" of those expenditures for
which the Personal Representative
since

the Personal Representative

liable.

is personally liable
is never personally

Otherwise, no Personal Representative, acting as

such, would ever be able to defend or prosecute any action
and would have no alternative but to roll over and play
dead whenever a claim was asserted regardless of whether or
not the claim was legitimate or reasonable in amount«
one

would

undertake

to

represent

the

No

Personal

Representative in contesting the claim since expenses are
always incurred in contesting claims, such as fees of
expert witnesses in good faith believed to be necessary to
defend, for example, a wrongful death action.
reasonably

necessary

expenses

of

the

All of the
Personal

Representative are to be paid by the probate Estate when
the defense or prosecution is undertaken in good faith.
The trial court found that Fenton acted in good faith in
proceeding with the trial on the Wrongful Death when his
fair offer was rejected

(T. pp. 116 & 117) rather than

suffer a default judgment for $650,000.00.
-24-

Expenses were

incurred in the Wrongful Death action where the major issue
was the economic damage to three adult children (T. p. 40),
in regard to which only the testimony of an expert witness
was competent and admissable.
The issue of liability for an expense as between the
Estate and Personal Representative is to be determined in
an appropriate proceeding relating to the administration of
the Estate as was done in this case.

§75-3-808(4) U.C.A.

(1953 as amended) (Add. 1).
Dennett v. First Security Banky

N.A., 439 P.2d

(1968)/ does not apply here for two reasons.
distinguishable

on

459

First, it is

its facts and deals only with a

contingent attorney fee claimed in lieu of the fee awarded
by the trial court, not expenses and disbursements nor
costs.

Second, it was decided prior to the adoption of the

Utah Uniform Probate Code,

which made its reasoning and

the law cited therein obsolete in Utah.
All of the expenses awarded by the trial court related
to

Fenton's

uncontested

appointment

based

upon

his

statutory priority or to Proceedings which occurred while
he was serving as Personal Representative.

Expenses and

disbursements are paid as an administration expense under
§75-3-805(1)(b) U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Add. 1)

and were

not set off against the amount of the claim established in
the Wrongful Death litigation.

The fact that the expenses

of the Personal Representative at the trial, including
-25-

attorney's

fees, would, by law, be paid from the Estate

before any claims established at the trial were paid must
have been considered by Kipp and his counsel before they
unreasonably rejected Fenton's reasonable, good faith offer
of settlement prior to trial (T. pp. 29, 94).
The
acted

evidence
in good

at

faith

trial

supports

the fact

that

Fenton

in all matters for which sums were

awarded for necessary expenses and disbursements.

The fact

that the result of applying the statutory law is that-* the
amounts remaining to be distributed to creditors is reduced
by the amount of the necessary expenses and disbursements
is merely

a consequence

specifically

of

authorized

the

by

legislative

statute, and

scheme, is

can

only

be

remedied by the Utah State Legislature.

ISSUE 4
WHETHER FINDINGS OF FACT
ORALLY BY THE TRIAL COURT
FOLLOWING THE CLOSE OF THE
REPEATED IN THE WRITTEN ORDER

AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW MADE
AND RECORDED IN OPEN COURT
EVIDENCE BUT WHICH ARE NOT
ARE SUFFICIENT?

Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Add. 1)
provides in pertinent part:
"It shall be sufficient if the findings of fact and
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in
open court following the close of the evidence or
appear in an opinion or memorandum decision filed by
the court."
The

trial

court

stated

its

findings

of

fact

and

conclusions of law orally, and they were recorded in open
court

following

the close of the evidence
-26-

(T. pp. 114-

117).

The findings of fact stated are adequate to support

the decision of the trial court.
The trial court considered the factors discussed in
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624f 625 (Utah, 1985),
and in accord with Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338
(Utah, 1979) the court made findings on all material
issues.

The facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted,

and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment.

The only issue at trial was whether the attocney

fees and expenses for the four categories of legal work
performed were reasonable (T.p. 114).
competent

evidence

at

trial

to

Kipp produced no

the

contrary.

The

Conclusions of Law were adequately stated and recorded in
open court (T. pp. 115-117).

The Order requiring that the

current Personal Representative pay from the assets of the
Estate

the amounts awarded as a cost and expense of

administration is proper and in accord with §75-3-718, §753-719, and §75-3-808 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Add. 1).
In any event, even if there had been a failure to enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law it does not require
reversal of the judgment.

If the findings and conclusions

are such that it is impossible to review the issues without
M

... invading the trial court's fact-finding domain...",

the judgment would be merely vacated, and the case remanded
for further proceedings, and the scope of the further
proceedings

would be limited
-27-

to the entry of proper

findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court.
Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah, 1987).
The

findings

of

fact and conclusions

of

law

are

sufficient to allow appellate review, and the decision of
the trial court should be sustained.

VIII.
CONCLUSION
Respondent, Fenton Glade Quinn, Jr., requests that 4:his
Court sustain the judgment of the Trial Court in this
matter.
Respectfully submitted this /Q^2- day of

/y/^du^

1990.

NIELSEN & SENIOR

IT. Kent Ludlow I

-28-

#-

B. Kent Ludlow
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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B. Kent Ludlqw
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Addendum 1
75-3-101. Devolution of estate at death—Restrictions.—The power
of a person to leave property by will and the rights of creditors, devisees,
and heirs to his property are subject to the restrictions and limitations
contained in this code to facilitate the prompt settlement of estates. Upon
the death of a person his real and personal property devolves to persons
to whom it is devised by his last will or to those indicated as substitutes
for them in cases involving lapse, renunciation, or other circumstances
affecting the devolution of testate estate, or in the absence of testamentary disposition, to his heirs, or to those indicated as substitutes for
them in cases involving renunciation or other circumstances affecting
devolution of intestate estates, subject to homestead allowance, exempt
property and family allowance, rights of creditors, elective share of the
surviving spouse, and administration.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-101, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4.

75-3-106. Scope of proceedings—Proceedings independent—Exception.—(1) Unless supervised administration as described in part 5 of
this chapter is involved:
(a) Each proceeding before the court or registrar is independent
of any other proceeding involving the same estate.
(b) Petitions for formal orders of the court may combine various
requests for relief in a single proceeding if the orders sought may be
finally granted without delay. Except as required for proceedings which
are particularly described by other sections of this chapter, no petition
is defective because it fails to embrace all matters which might then be
the subject of a final order.
(c) Proceedings for probate of wills or adjudications of no will may
be combined with proceedings for appointment of personal representatives.
(d) A proceeding for appointment of a personal representative is
concluded by an order making or declining the appointment.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-106, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4.

75-3-705. Duty of personal representative—Inventory and appraisement.—Within three months after his appointment, a personal representative, who is not a special administrator or a successor to another
representative who has previously discharged this duty, shall prepare
an inventory of property owned by the decedent at the time of his
death, listing it with reasonable detail, and indicating as to each
listed item, its fair market value as of the date of the decedent's
death, and the type and amount of any encumbrance that may exist
with reference to any item. The personal representative shall send a
copy of the inventory to interested persons who request i t He may also
file the original of the inventory with the court.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-705, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4; L. 1977, ch. 194,
§34.

75-3-707- Duty of personal representative—Supplementary inventory.—If any property not included in the original inventory comes
to the knowledge ot a personal representative or if the personal representative learns that the value or description indicated in the original
inventory for any item is erroneous or misleading, he shall make a supplementary inventory or appraisement showing the market value as
of the date of the decedent's death of the new item or the revised
market value or descriptions, and the appraisers or other data relied
upon, if any, and file it with the court if the original inventory was
filed, or furnish copies thereof or information thereof to persons interested in the new information.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-707. enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, §4.

75-3-715. Powers and duties of successor personal representative.—A
successor personal representative has the same power and duty as the
original personal representative to complete the administration and distribution of the estate, as expeditiously as possible, but he shall not
exercise any power expressly made personal to the executor named in
the will.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-715, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4.

75-3-718. Compensation of personal representative and attorney.—
When no compensation is provided by the will, or the personal representative renounces all claim thereto, he shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for his services; provided, however, the compensation for a
normal probate proceeding shall not exceed the sum of the following
amounts of the probate estate:
5% of the first $1,000;
4% of the next $4,000;
3 % of the next $5,000;
2% of the next $40,000;
ll/ 2 % of the next $50,000; and
1% of the amount over $100,000.
When no compensation is provided by will, or the attorney renounces
all claim thereto, the attorney for the personal representative shall be
entitled to reasonable compensation for his services; provided, however,
the compensation for a normal probate proceeding shall not exceed the
sum of the following amounts of the probate estate:
5% of the first $20,000;
4% of the next $40,000;
3 % of the next $140,000;
2Y2% of the next $550,000;
2% of the next $750,000; and
IY2Y0 of the balance.
Such additional compensation may be allowed to the personal representative and/or the attorney as the court may deem just and reasonable
for any extraordinary services, including the filing of Federal estate tax
returnH i s t o r y : C. 1953, 75-3-718, enacted by
L. 1977, ch. 194, § 37.

75-3-718- Compensation of personal representative a n d attorney..
(1) A personal representative and an attorney are entitled to reasonable
compensation for their services,
(2) If a will provides for compensation of the personal representative and
there is no-contract with the decedent regarding compensation, he may renounce the provision before qualifying and be entitled to reasonable compensation. A personal representative also may renounce his right to all or any
part of the compensation. A written renunciation of fee may be filed with the
court.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-718, enacted b y L.
1987, c h . 32, § L
R e p e a l s a n d R e e n a c t m e n t s . — Laws 1987,
ch. 32, § 1 repeals former § 75-3-718, as en-

acted by Laws 1977, ch. 194t § 37, setting out a
schedule of limitations on the compensation of
personal representatives and attorneys, a n d
enacts the present section

75-3-719- Expenses in estate litigation.—If any personal representative or person nominated as personal representative defends or
prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he
is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-719, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, §4.

75-3-805. Classification of claims.—(1) If the applicable assets of
the estate are insufficient to pay all claims in full, the personal representative shall make payment in the following order:
(a) Reasonable funeral expenses;
(b) Costs and expenses of administration;
(c) Debts and taxes with preference under federal law;
(d) Reasonable and necessary medical and hospital expenses of the
last illness of the decedent, including compensation of persons attending
him;
(e) Debts and taxes with preference under other laws of this state;
(f) All other claims.
(2) No preference shall be given in the payment of any claim over
any other claim of the same class, and a claim due and payable shall not
be entitled to a preference over claims not due.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-805, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4.

75-3-808, Individual liability of personal representative.—(1) Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a personal representative is not
individually liable on a contract properly entered into in his fiduciary
capacity in the course of administration of the estate unless he fails to
reveal his representative capacity and identify the estate in the contract.
(2) A personal representative is individually liable for obligations
arising from ownership or control of the estate or for torts committed in
the course of administration of the estate only if he is personally at
fault.
(3) Claims based on contracts entered into by a personal representative in his fiduciary capacity, on obligations arising from ownership or
control of the estate, or on torts committed in the course of estate administration may be asserted against the estate by proceeding against
the personal representative in his fiduciary capacity, whether or not the
personal representative is individually liable therefor.
(4) Issues of liability as between the estate and the personal representative individually may be determined in a proceeding for accounting, surcharge, or indemnification or other appropriate proceeding.
History: C- 1953, 75-3-80S, enacted
by L, 1975, ciu 150, § 4.

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings
on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) A m e n d m e n t Upon motion of a party made not
later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court
may amend its findings or make additional findings
and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in
actions tried by the court without a jury, the question
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the
party raising the question has made in the district
court an objection to such findings or has made either
a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a
motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact a n d conclusions
o f l a w . Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact
and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties
to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the
trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in
the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)

PART VIL
JUDGMENT.
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these
rules includes a decree and any order from which an
a
ppeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of
prior proceedings.
(o) J u d g m e n t upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, and or when multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
° n e or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
f)n
ly upon an express determination by the court that
ther
e is no just reason for delay and upon an express

direction for the entry of judgment In the absence of
such determination and direction, any order or other
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and
the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties.
(c) Demand for j u d g m e n t
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against
whom a judgment is entered by default, every
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled,
even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings, it may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when
the justice of the case requires it, determine the
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
(2) J u d g m e n t by d e f a u l t A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in
the demand for judgment
(d) Costs.
(1) To w h o m awarded. Except when express
provision therefor is made either in a statute of
this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed
as of course to the prevailing party unless the
court otherwise directs; provided, however,
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for
review, shall abide the final determination of the
cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent
permitted by law.
(2) H o w a s s e s s e d . The party who claims his
costs must within five days after the entry of
judgment serve upon the adverse party against
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court
a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct,
and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within
seven days after service of the memorandum of
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed
by the court in which the judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after
the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the
service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment,
shall nevertheless be considered as served and
filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the
j u d g m e n t The clerk must include in any judgment
signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the
same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must,
within two days after the costs have been taxed or
ascertained, in any case where not included in the
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the
judgment docket.
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